Six months of stalemate: Kurdistan’s government formation crisis deepens
Shafaq News/ Six months after the October 2024 parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region, no new government has been formed. Repeated negotiations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have failed to overcome entrenched political divisions, prolonging a vacuum that is casting shadows across the Region’s economy, governance, and public sentiment.
Enduring Paralysis
The current deadlock is not unprecedented in the political history of the Kurdistan Region. Past government formation processes have also oscillated between brief negotiations and drawn-out disputes, at times extending over a year. These cycles of tension have often been driven by unresolved rivalries between the KDP and PUK, undermining efforts to establish a stable, consensus-based administration. The current phase, however, carries greater implications due to the compounded pressures of economic strain and regional realignments.
Historical Fault Lines Resurface
At the heart of the impasse lies a long-standing rivalry between the KDP and PUK. Despite a power-sharing arrangement that followed a brutal civil war in the 1990s, mistrust has continued to characterize their relationship. The KDP maintains control over Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK dominates Al-Sulaymaniyah and adjacent areas. This geographic-political split has consistently manifested in disputes over governance, revenue allocation, and administrative authority.
Tensions escalated sharply in 2022 when the KDP accused figures within the PUK of involvement in the assassination of a senior security official in Erbil. The fallout led to a prolonged PUK boycott of the KRG cabinet. Although the party’s ministers returned by mid-2023, the episode left a lasting scar on bilateral trust.
Further strain emerged when the PUK filed a legal challenge in Baghdad against the Kurdistan parliamentary election law, leading to the delay of the scheduled 2022 vote. The KDP interpreted this as an attempt to alter electoral rules to its disadvantage, heightening the political standoff.
Fragmented Mandate and Renewed Competition
The rescheduled elections in October 2024 produced a fragmented legislature. The KDP secured 39 seats, followed by the PUK with 23, while opposition forces, led by the New Generation Movement, gained 15 seats. Out of 100 total seats, no party emerged with a majority, creating a suspended parliament that necessitates coalition-building to form a government.
This electoral outcome raised a fundamental question: would the KDP and PUK resume their power-sharing model, or would one attempt to govern alone? Initially, both sides hinted at bypassing each other.
The KDP floated the idea of forming a majority government with smaller allies, wary that the PUK could obstruct policy implementation from within. Conversely, the PUK explored an opposition-based coalition excluding the KDP. However, with neither party able to secure a stable majority, both were compelled to return to the negotiating table—this time burdened with years of political baggage and mistrust.
Contentious Negotiations and Power-Sharing Demands
Talks have focused primarily on the distribution of senior sovereign and administrative posts. Since December 2024, more than half a dozen negotiation rounds have taken place, culminating most recently in a high-level meeting in Dukan involving KDP deputy head and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and PUK President Bafel Talabani.
Despite an outwardly positive tone, no substantial breakthrough was reported. The PUK presented an extensive list of demands, reflecting its insistence on what it calls “genuine partnership,” while the KDP viewed many of these as infringing on its electoral mandate as the largest bloc.
Some political observers believe the PUK’s insistence on certain positions is strategically linked to securing KDP support for retaining the Iraqi presidency in the upcoming federal elections. The presidency, currently held by PUK-affiliated Abdul Latif Rashid, remains a symbolic but significant lever of influence in Baghdad.
On the other side, the KDP reportedly offered tactical concessions, including an initial agreement to allocate the Ministry of Peshmerga and the Ministry of Finance to the PUK. However, the PUK also demanded exclusion of internal rivals from any future cabinet—a veiled reference to the People’s Front Party led by Lahur Sheikh Jangi, Bafel Talabani’s estranged cousin, who secured two seats in the elections and is reportedly eyeing the Peshmerga portfolio.
Between these two positions, the government formation file remains unresolved with no clear solution in sight. Every time the negotiating delegations meet and draft a portfolio distribution list, a new disagreement or additional condition emerges, hindering consensus.
Both parties implicitly acknowledge that finalizing the deal now requires a "comprehensive package" that likely includes understandings beyond the region—such as mutual guarantees over federal positions in Baghdad as well.
On this matter, political observer Kamal Raouf told Shafaq News that the PUK believes the position of Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament—although secured—lacks sufficient influence in the political landscape. Therefore, “the party is seeking to expand its influence as it prepares for active participation in the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections.”
For his part, senior PUK official Burhan Sheikh Raouf confirmed that both parties have made significant strides toward forming the new government, particularly regarding political and administrative programs. However, the current phase is witnessing sharp disagreements over the distribution of posts.
He clarified that the PUK seeks genuine partnership—not merely symbolic roles like deputy presidencies, but real participation in managing sovereign and service-related positions. He stressed the importance of balanced power-sharing between the two parties.
Sheikh Raouf also denied rumors suggesting any intention to delay government formation until after the Iraqi elections, affirming that both parties share a common will to form a strong government that meets the demands of the current regional situation.
In turn, Kazem Yawar, a researcher in Kurdish political affairs, told Shafaq News Agency, "All these disputes have cast a shadow and created undesirable consequences. There are also financial and economic repercussions due to the delay in forming the government. Politically, there is a wide gap between the opposition parties and the two ruling parties in the region."
"There are reports—though not confirmed—that government formation may be postponed until the next Iraqi elections, scheduled for November. This issue can only be resolved through a swift agreement and a clear statement from the political bureaus of both parties as soon as possible."
Regional Tensions and the Oil Conundrum
The Kurdistan Region’s internal discord is unfolding against a backdrop of regional and economic turmoil. The suspension of oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline since March 2023—due to legal disputes between Baghdad and Ankara—has deprived the region of a vital revenue stream. Exports previously accounted for over 80% of the region’s financial inflows.
This has led to a liquidity crisis, impacting the KRG’s ability to pay civil servants and Peshmerga salaries. Although Baghdad passed a federal budget that earmarks funds for the Region, it demanded control over oil sales through the state-owned SOMO company in return.
Faced with mounting fiscal pressure, the KRG agreed to deposit oil revenues into the federal treasury—a major retreat from the financial autonomy it enjoyed for nearly two decades.
The fragmented Kurdish position weakened their leverage in negotiations with Baghdad. While the PUK prioritized securing payments for Al-Sulaymaniyah, even at the cost of centralization, the KDP resisted compromise, hoping for more favorable terms.
A government source in Baghdad told Shafaq News Agency that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has, on several occasions, found himself dealing with two Kurdish counterparts instead of one, as messages from Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah often diverged. “While the Kurdish Government under Masrour Barzani calls on Baghdad to uphold its financial obligations to the Kurdistan Region in line with the Constitution, Bafel Talabani has been pressing through his own channels for immediate funding for PUK-controlled areas—regardless of previously agreed-upon budget shares.”
"The lack of unity between KDP and PUK has weakened the Region’s position in negotiations with Baghdad. The federal government took advantage of this division to impose its terms, capitalizing on both parties’ urgent need for funds.” One analyst told Shafaq News.
Geopolitical Divergences and Cross-Border Strains
Beyond Baghdad, tensions with neighboring states further complicate the regional picture. Turkiye, a key oil export partner and major political actor in Erbil, shuttered Al-Sulaymaniyah Airport for several months in 2023 over alleged PUK ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and halted all flights from the airport to Ankara. The closure followed an incident involving a plane carrying the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which Turkiye claimed underscored PUK complicity in supporting PKK operations.
This divergence illustrates broader geopolitical alignments: the KDP maintains strong ties with Ankara and Washington, while the PUK leans closer to Tehran and remains open to PKK-aligned groups in the region.
Iran, too, has exerted pressure on the KRG by targeting Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating from the region—actions that elicited different responses from Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah. The KDP has approached Tehran’s demands cautiously, while the PUK has been more accommodating.
These foreign entanglements have turned Kurdistan into a proxy arena for Turkiye-Iran rivalry, adding layers of complexity to the already fraught internal dynamics.
Institutional Paralysis
The deadlock has effectively paralyzed Kurdistan’s institutions. Since the new parliament convened on December 3, 2024, no leadership has been elected—not even a speaker. Under the Region’s law, electing a speaker is a prerequisite for electing the Kurdish president, who in turn tasks the leading bloc with forming the government.
This impasse has left the legislature inoperative for nearly six months, with no lawmaking or oversight functions exercised. In fact, the previous parliament was itself extended beyond its term and remained largely inactive, meaning the region has endured institutional stagnation for over a year and a half.
Possible Scenarios Ahead
Several scenarios are now conceivable as the region navigates its political deadlock.
- Comprehensive Agreement: The most constructive path forward would involve a power-sharing agreement by mid-year. This would likely require both parties to offer bold concessions. The PUK may have to forgo claims to the presidency in exchange for control of key ministries and federal guarantees. The KDP would need to accommodate the PUK’s demands for a deeper role in security and administration.
- Prolonged Deadlock: Failure to reach a deal may extend the crisis until after Iraq’s federal elections in November 2025. This would mean continued governance by a caretaker cabinet, further weakening administrative continuity and public trust.
- De Facto Division (as seen in 1994–2006): While not publicly advocated, a return to dual administrations—one in Erbil, another in Al-Sulaymaniyah—remains a latent possibility. The memory of the 1990s split lingers, and although political leaders deny interest in reviving it, the growing schism in authority could evolve into a hard separation if current trends persist.
At a Crossroads
For now, the Kurdistan Region stands at a critical juncture. Observers say that it is a conflict not just between two parties, but between two generations of leadership: “the founders who shaped Kurdistan’s modern autonomy and their successors, who now grapple with inherited divisions and emerging complexities.”
